Teoria dei giochi - Game theory

Algorithmic game theory

Exam rules

The students who regularly attended the lectures in class during the academic year 2022/23 can choose to take the exam in one of the following ways::

  1. oral interview

  2. seminar plus written report

while all the others must necessarily take the interview.

The interview is about the topics of the lectures and it is made of a sequence of wide-spectrum questions that aim at checking their comprehension. The seminar (approximately 45 minutes) and the report are about a specific topic that deepens and/or broadens the contents of the lectures or deals with a side topic. The topic is chosen upon a common agreement with the instructor, once it is agreed the report has to be handed within 2 months.
Except for peculiar situations, the seminars will be scheduled in-presence with streaming (@google meet) for the audience while the interviews will take place in-presence only.

In order to take the exam please contact the instructor by email to request the interview or choose the topic of the seminar. Later on, please sign on esami.unipi.it for the exam session reporting the agreed date.
Oral exams and seminars can be requested at any moment, but the interview or the choice of the topic are guaranteed only after the first deadline following the request. Interviews will take place in a unique date agreed with all the candidates. After the last deadline requests are still feasible but interviews and seminars can be taken/delivered only in a unique date during the winter session (January-February). In this latter circumstance the choice of the topic won't be freely agreed but constrained to the list of precise seminars that is available below.

Deadlines

10 June
30 June
15 July
30 July (for seminars only)
30 August
20 September
15 October

Date for oral exams: 15 January

Date for seminars: tba (some day on Febrary)

List of previous seminars (in Italian)

Proposals of seminars

  1. Strong equilibria in routing and congestion games
  2. Coalition formation and Pareto optimality
  3. Cooperative games with overlapping coalitions
  4. Voluntary participation in public goods economy
  5. Two stage games for oligopolistic competition over price and capacity
  6. Approval-based committee elections
  7. Free riders over networks
  8. Convergence and approximation of Nash equilibria
  9. Multiagent cooperation in multiperiod portfolio selection
  10. Lipschitz games and approximate equilibria